Gorbachev and Yeltsin's confrontation is brief. The confrontation reaches its peak

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution

higher professional education

"ULYANOVSK STATE TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY"

Department of History and Culture

in the discipline "History"

on the topic: “M.S. Gorbachev, B.N. Yeltsin as comrades and political antipodes"

Completed:

Maltseva Yu.E.

Ulyanovsk

Introduction

Gorbachev M.S. in power

1 Beginning of the reign of M.S. Gorbachev

2 Gorbachev's reforms

Beginning of Yeltsin's reign

Collapse of the USSR

Yeltsin and Gorbachev: the struggle of the titans

Conclusion

Introduction

Gorbachev and Yeltsin are two of the most prominent Russian politicians of the late twentieth century. Two people who played a key role in the Great Anti-Communist (in other words, liberal-democratic) revolution that took place in Russia in the late eighties and nineties of the last century. The paradox, however, is that, while essentially doing one great thing, these two were constantly in fierce confrontation with each other. This confrontation, of course, took a lot of strength from both, but at the same time, perhaps, charged both with additional energy. This happens in any struggle - military, sports... Political. The passionate desire to defeat an opponent often includes some previously unknown sources of strength to the person himself.

In the case of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, at times it seemed that the struggle between them was being waged towards destruction, but in the end it turned out that it was leading to creation. Yes, the old, rotten, unviable communist regime was destroyed, but the road was opened to the construction of a saving democratic system for Russia, based on a market economy.

They were both systemic people. Otherwise, they would not have made a political career in the Soviet Union and would not have reached the very top. But that's probably all that brings them together. They became opponents, even antipodes. But most importantly, they were destined to play opposite roles.

The purpose of this work is to study the personalities of M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, in determining the achievements and failures in their activities as leaders.

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks:

)study literary and other sources on the topic;

)analyze the sources found;

)compare different points of view of historians and public figures on the topic;

)identify positive and negative aspects in the activities of Russian politicians;

)present the results obtained during the study in the form of an abstract.

Gorbachev Yeltsin politician perestroika

1. Gorbachev M.S. in power.

1 Beginning of the reign of M.S. Gorbachev

Graduate of the Faculty of Law of Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov, M.S. Gorbachev is a theorist and intellectual, fascinated by images of ideological ought. His struggle for power and change is associated with maintaining a complex system of ideas, meanings and signs. At the same time, he, as an experienced courtier, carefully and consistently avoids any actions that, in his opinion, could unexpectedly and greatly destabilize the system. This is why M.S.’s international activities are so successful. Gorbachev and the policy of “glasnost”, which returned the truth about Russian and Soviet history. But that's why he stops halfway when it comes to real economic change. The values of socialist choice in practice are in irreconcilable contradiction with the principle of free market.

We must remember that Mikhail Gorbachev received the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party, in general, almost by accident and not at all because he was a famous reformer or a very principled person. On the contrary, he never shone with special talents or specific achievements. But he was one of the youngest, talkative and charming party functionaries.

Remember: in just three or four years (1981-1985), first the last ideologist of the communist regime, Suslov, died, and then three General Secretaries in a row - Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko. Without such a radical cleansing of the Soviet political arena, fifty-four-year-old Gorbachev would never have become secretary general. Another dying Secretary General in this situation would be a clear overkill. The Kremlin elders were already laughed at all over the world.

In addition, Mikhail Gorbachev was considered a relatively gentle and intelligent person. Until then, he had not been distinguished by any particularly decisive actions or radical views. No one was afraid of him, which is why he probably became a compromise candidate who was acceptable to a variety of groups in the political elite of those years. By this time, it became clear to many: the USSR had no future. On the one hand, the Soviet economic model was stalled, as a result of which the economic situation was rapidly deteriorating. Labor productivity left much to be desired, there was a general shortage of goods and services, grain imports increased, and external debt increased. If not for the rise in prices for oil, gold and other commodities in the 1970s, the Soviet Union would have collapsed much earlier.

The war in Afghanistan worsened the possibility of external financing of the Soviet system. Ronald Reagan took a tough course towards confrontation, and the USSR again had to participate in an arms race that was already beyond its strength. The collapsing economy, the ideological vacuum, the war in Afghanistan, which did not find a patriotic response among the people - all this was the reason for the start of radical changes in the country.

In April 1985, the young (by Soviet standards) Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR. Of course, he had no trace of any reform plan. But what a striking difference from Brezhnev, Chernenko, Andropov! In December 1984, he visited Great Britain, met Margaret Thatcher and made a favorable impression on her. Easy to communicate, not a "hawk", loves to talk about problems, clearly strives for international recognition. You can cooperate with this.

1.2 Gorbachev's reforms

Soon Gorbachev began a massive cleansing of the party apparatus, but the infection was already so deep that this did not produce any serious results. Gorbachev could not save the rotten system.

The shortage of personnel, which is still noticeable today, was extremely acute then. From the first steps, confusion began around what, to whom and how to do it, Gorbachev clearly did not know what should be done. The very first major action of the authorities - limiting drunkenness (our real national problem) - turned into a complete failure. It seems that the goals were pursued correctly, but everything was done so absurdly that the result was exactly the opposite. Instead of gratitude, Gorbachev earned ridicule, and the stupid implementation of directives led to an even greater erosion of trust in the authorities. Budget revenues decreased sharply, but they did not drink less (moon brewing received unprecedented development). There was a lot of chatter in the economy at that time and almost no real action. One unconditional achievement is the resolution of the cooperative movement. Since no one really understood what cooperatives were, in fact, purely private enterprises were allowed, and with almost no taxes. Many of today's new Russians started back then, that is, the foundations of private business were laid by Mikhail Gorbachev.

The countries of Eastern Europe quickly realized that the USSR had weakened and now they were their own masters. Rapid democratic changes began in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. It is clear that these countries should be grateful to Gorbachev.

Politicians inside the country understood the same thing - the union republics “stirred.” The gradual collapse of the Union began, centrifugal tendencies grew like a snowball. The main slogan of Mikhail Gorbachev is the improvement of the socialist political and economic system. The country took out more and more foreign loans, bought Western machinery and equipment that rusted in warehouses and freight stations, and nothing, of course, changed. There were still no property rights, freedom of competition and freedom of prices - economic reform actually stalled.

The only serious political breakthrough during the perestroika period was achieved in the spheres of openness, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and movement. For the first time under Mikhail Gorbachev, the process of mass emigration stopped for some time - people believed that the country had a chance, there was a future and there was no point in leaving here for the West.

On the one hand there was political freedom (remember - "glasnost"!), on the other - an economic system doomed to death plus attempts to maintain the commanding role of the party. Given the pressing national problems coupled with general economic complications and a weak center, the collapse of the Union was inevitable. As a result, the system could not stand it and exploded - all the leaders of the union republics were interested only in personal power. Boris Yeltsin was no exception here. Everyone wanted to get their own kingdom and become a full-fledged master in it. No one thought about the welfare of the people and did not ask their opinion.

In a word, for the most part, Gorbachev simply went with the flow, almost without influencing events, without trying to streamline them and give them a certain vector. Meanwhile, the Soviet system was rapidly falling apart. Bloody conflicts on ethnic grounds occurred in Sumgait and Fergana, blood was shed in Baku, Tbilisi, and Vilnius. National contradictions deepened, centrifugal processes intensified, and the Soviet state machine experienced more and more noticeable failures.

The entire USSR shuddered when it heard about the massacre of Armenians in Sumgait; yesterday’s neighbors killed each other, sparing neither women nor children. Hundreds of corpses across the country showed that perestroika, unwittingly, revealed deep-seated national problems that the Soviet government had previously only artificially obscured. And Gorbachev continued to make more and more lengthy and vague speeches and could not stop. People stopped listening to his speeches and began to openly laugh at him. He constantly traveled abroad, begged for loans and accepted congratulations on events in which he did not take part, which he did not direct and on which he had almost no influence at all.

Mikhail Gorbachev's key problem was the inability to act, the inability to create a strong team, the inability to look into tomorrow. The achievements of his domestic policy boiled down to the removal of censorship and restrictions on movement (which, however, was extremely important).

People quickly became disillusioned with such one-sided reforms. On the other hand, it was under Gorbachev that long-overdue changes began in the political and economic system, thanks to which he will forever go down in history, despite the fact that in Russia his popularity rating does not even reach 1%.

The generally accepted view in the West is that this costly arms race finished off the USSR. Other experts believe that “perestroika” was planned by Gorbachev and therefore he can and should be considered the greatest figure of our time. In Russia itself, many citizens, especially the older generation, consider Gorbachev a traitor, a destroyer, and an agent of the West.

Gorbachev in world history will remain the man who changed its course. Moreover, he did the impossible: he crushed not just the regime and the empire - he brought down the world system, which claimed global dominance, and brought it down precisely when it still seemed unshakable, thereby changing the world order. Gorbachev was the first Russian leader who decided not to use violence in his struggle for power while still controlling the instruments of violence. Gorbachev was the first leader in Russian history to leave the top post without resisting or attempting to extend his power through the search for a successor. He left with dignity and with his head held high, without clinging to the Kremlin, which has never happened in the history of this empire.

I believe that Mikhail Gorbachev sincerely tried to save the Soviet system by modernizing it and failed. He did not understand the hopelessness of his attempt, did not understand the essence of the problems facing him, but he certainly played an outstanding role in our history.

2. Beginning of Yeltsin's reign

Graduate of the Faculty of Construction of the Ural Polytechnic Institute named after. CM. Kirova, B.N. Yeltsin is an athlete, a builder and a born leader, immersed in the thick of real life, and is a living bearer of modern human experience. The thirst for change against the backdrop of a sudden slowdown in reforms, an increasing discrepancy between words and deeds (this process in the newspapers of that time was called the “chattering of perestroika”) creates in society a socio-psychological need for a leader of a different, charismatic type. And active, dynamic B.N. Yeltsin is happy to take on this new role.

Accustomed to decisive action, Boris Yeltsin immediately began to carry out radical economic reforms in the country. The Masons, who had been courting Boris Yeltsin since the days of the Interregional Deputy Group of 1989, proposed one of their young activists, Yegor Gaidar, to implement economic reforms. On January 2, 1992, E. Gaidar began a “shock therapy” program by lowering prices for all goods in the country. The jump in prices turned out to be much stronger than declared; prices for some goods increased tens of times.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin were not always hostile to each other. Two communist bosses, two party secretaries: one of the Stavropol regional committee, the other of the Sverdlovsk regional committee - why should they be at enmity? One, Gorbachev, moved up the hill earlier - secretary of the Central Committee, member of the Politburo and, finally, secretary general. The other, Yeltsin, was late and was dragged to Moscow by Gorbachev, who had gone ahead, who, having become the head of the party (and, accordingly, the state), having conceived perestroika, began to shake up the party and state elite and recruit his own team. Yeltsin also fell into it. I got it, - at the suggestion of the second person in the party, Secretary of the Central Committee Yegor Ligachev. So it was to these two that Yeltsin owed his sharp career rise, and, accordingly, it seemed that he should have felt immeasurable and inescapable gratitude to both of them.

But Yeltsin was not like that. At some point he rebelled...

3. Collapse of the USSR

The President of the USSR, trying to save his project, put forward the idea of renewing the Soviet Union through the conclusion of a new Union Treaty. As part of the continuation of political reform, the economic independence of the Soviet republics grew, and their government bodies were updated. However, all these changes against the backdrop of a deepening economic crisis contributed to the growth of contradictions with the Union Center and the further “scattering” of the republics. The dismantling of the communist party apparatus of control and coercion led to a complete weakening of the ideological and economic bonds of the once united union: the national elites no longer saw any rational arguments in favor of the continued presence of their republics within the USSR and began the practical implementation of plans for their secession.

Under these conditions, the political struggle for the symbolic center of the Soviet Union - Russia and Moscow - began to play a special role. In the initial period of reforms on the initiative of M.S. Gorbachev appointed B.N. as the main political leader of Moscow. Yeltsin, who quickly made this city a “showcase of perestroika.” Subsequently B.N. Yeltsin was removed from all party posts and, according to the logic of the party bureaucrats, should have sunk into political obscurity. However, in practice the opposite happened. In the wake of socio-political activity in the late 1980s - early 1990s, B.N. Yeltsin was elevated to the heights of power in the RSFSR and headed the renewed Supreme Council of the RSFSR.

From this moment until the collapse of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin becomes a kind of political antipodes for each other.

A qualitative change in the situation occurred in August 1991, when the conservative part of the union leadership attempted a coup and created the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) in order to keep the Soviet system of power intact. The actions of the State Emergency Committee were called “putsch”.

Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin took the most active, one might say key, part in the events. Yeltsin resolutely refused to recognize the power of the Emergency Committee and organized active resistance to it. The main motive was political - the actions of the communists ran counter to the bourgeois-democratic views of Yeltsin of 1991. Another motive for resistance was that the union bodies in any form limited the personal power of Boris Yeltsin, who was striving for autocracy. “Autocracy” and at the same time “democracy” of Yeltsin are a paradoxical reality and a character trait of Boris Yeltsin.

Arriving early in the morning of August 19, 1991, at the House of Soviets of Russia, nicknamed at that time the White House, Boris Yeltsin climbed onto a tank put up by the putschists and read out a proclamation from it, calling not to carry out the orders of the Emergency Committee. The image of Yeltsin on the tank went down in history and became a symbol of the decisiveness of Boris Yeltsin's actions in this episode and many future ones. Yeltsin was able to organize active resistance, his supporters formed combat detachments, and the defenders of the White House were armed with several hundred machine guns and several dozen machine guns. Yeltsin's supporters agitated the troops, who en masse began to go over to Yeltsin's side and raise tricolor flags on armored vehicles. Among those who transferred was the commander of the airborne troops of the USSR Armed Forces, Pavel Grachev.

After three days of confrontation, the putsch failed, B. Yeltsin sent a plane with armed officers led by General A. Rutsky to free M. Gorbachev. The four-year conflict with Gorbachev ended in complete triumph for Yeltsin, who, having first suffered a crushing defeat, did not fold his arms and found a path to victory from a hopeless situation. The last humiliation of Gorbachev was the situation when Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly interrupted his speech on the podium and forced the dumbfounded Gorbachev, in front of millions of television viewers, to sign a decree banning the CPSU.

After the defeat of the Emergency Committee, Yeltsin issued a series of Decrees re-subordinating the allied army, police, KGB, and USSR President Gorbachev. In September 1991, Yeltsin supported Gorbachev’s idea of transforming the USSR into a Union of Sovereign States, and in October stated that “Russia will never initiate the collapse of the Union.” Yeltsin gained power over the USSR and was no longer interested in fighting against the Soviet

Union, but the situation was already developing according to a different scenario. Immediately after the defeat of the putsch, Ukraine adopted the Declaration of Independence, and the USSR de facto ceased to exist.

4. Yeltsin and Gorbachev: the struggle of the titans

I think the West was very lucky that Mikhail Gorbachev, and not Boris Yeltsin, became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at one time. The first is a relatively soft and indecisive professional careerist bureaucrat. The second is a seasoned wolf who managed to make a party career, primarily due to his toughness and assertiveness. Fate brought these two antipodes together.

Boris Yeltsin came into conflict with the communist system, in my opinion, primarily because, by old Soviet standards, under the relatively young Gorbachev, he had no chance to rise to the very top of the political ladder under any circumstances. If he had become the General Secretary of the Communist Party, he would have defended communism with all his might, not sparing democrats and reformers in the least. We are very lucky that it was not Yeltsin who saved communism.

Yeltsin is a politician who is more intuitive than rational. He senses problems rather than identifying them based on study and analysis of the situation. He clearly lacked the knowledge to solve the vast majority of issues of public administration, but at the same time, intuitively he almost always went in the right direction.

In other words, Yeltsin was the type of leader-fighter, leader-tribune, who felt good in public, who loved to control the masses, but was by no means a subtle administrator and business executive, not a person capable of looking into the future and overflowing with new ideas. What he really knew how to do brilliantly was to amazingly accurately capture the mood of society, unravel the intrigues of his rivals and deliver pre-emptive strikes. At the same time, he cannot be denied personal courage, although he often preferred to unjustifiably delay decisions.

Continuing the comparative analysis of the two previous leaders of our country, it should be noted that the Sverdlovsk region (which was once led by B. Yeltsin) and the Stavropol Territory (which was once led by M. Gorbachev) are very different places. The largest northern industrial region, tightly regulated, mechanistic, and the southern agricultural region, dependent on weather conditions and agricultural pests... By the very nature of the patrimony that he inherited, Yeltsin is significantly more like a seasoned regional committee secretary (Stalinist type) than Gorbachev.

Boris Nikolaevich's wife, Naina, is a soft and very modest woman who never dominated the Yeltsin family (unlike Raisa Gorbacheva) and this, by the way, says a lot about the character of Boris Nikolaevich himself. A wife, as a rule, has qualities that her husband lacks.

Yeltsin is much less soft, verbose and streamlined than Gorbachev, and, accordingly, he has more determination, toughness and indifference to the feelings of the people around him. He could drink a lot, take a steam bath, swim in an ice hole - a real Russian man according to accepted concepts. However, Yeltsin was not just tough, but sometimes cruel. Not everyone is capable of ordering his press secretary (V. Kostikov) to be thrown overboard a ship into the icy waters of the Yenisei, tenderly hug and kiss an official (S. Stepashin) whom he himself will fire tomorrow, arrange a public undeserved reprimand for the venerable minister (Rodionov, there was such a minister defense).

Yeltsin crossed out dozens of people who were once very close to him from his life and never thought about them again. But among them there were people who risked their lives and careers for his sake. Of all Yeltsin’s associates and close assistants, almost none have survived in power to this day.

Boris Yeltsin earned the love of Soviet democrats by the fact that he began to rudely “assault” Moscow party members, turning ordinary people against their bosses - he proudly showed the public domestic shoes and watches, raided store back rooms to discover hidden goods, and solemnly changed to a Moskvich. and registered at the district clinic. One of the secretaries of the district party committee in Moscow even committed suicide because of his unfair thrashings; someone’s heart could not stand it. But Yeltsin did not care about such trifles on his triumphant path to power.

Yeltsin's political style has always been distinguished by the most unabashed populism, in contrast to Gorbachev's restrained officialdom. But his populism was not sincere, it did not correspond to his beliefs. In essence, it was a cynical deception. Just look at the episode of his registration at the district clinic - a symbolic act of fighting against the privileges of officials, although with him the bureaucrats became more relaxed than ever before. But at the same time, Yeltsin had an unconditional talent for leading a variety of people. We can say that Boris Nikolaevich was a politician from God.

Probably, Yeltsin was always interested in power only as a goal, and not as a means - he, like Gorbachev, never had any positive program. By nature, perhaps, Yeltsin was even more of a destroyer than a creator. Amazingly acute instincts of self-preservation (sense of danger), frequent lack of formal logic, discouraging unpredictability - these are the characteristic features of Yeltsin the politician.

Alcohol and a penchant for eccentric antics also add several colorful touches to the portrait of Boris Yeltsin. Once upon a time, the future president (and already a famous fighter against the system) fell from a bridge under strange circumstances (he seemed to be returning from a lady's), then he conducted an orchestra in Berlin in a drunken state, then, under the lens of a television camera, he pinched his secretary in the Kremlin. He did not get off the plane to meet the Irish Prime Minister in Shannon, while in Sweden, mixed up the countries in an official speech and called Sweden Norway.

From the very beginning, Boris Yeltsin's behavior was dominated by one obsession - irreconcilable competition with Gorbachev. The main task for him was to gain full power.

Boris Yeltsin, unlike Gorbachev, was always capable of decisive action, even if these actions were on the verge of legality. For the sake of fairness, it should be admitted that he never stooped to closing opposition newspapers, and all his political enemies remained at large. Yes, that’s what he was - an authoritarian and impulsive President, capable, however, of keeping himself within certain limits.

The confrontation between two personalities, two political leaders in 1989-1991. ended with the complete victory of Boris Yeltsin, although Gorbachev seemed to many to be a more modern leader. Soon, however, Mikhail Gorbachev as a political figure disappeared from the domestic political scene, which indicated that he had no real base, no real forces on which he could rely, and therefore, his rise to power was an accident.

It is far from a fact that this outcome of the struggle of the titans was unequivocally positive on all sides. But the passage of time cannot be changed, and the 1990s will forever go down in Russian history as the years of Boris Yeltsin’s rule (he was in power almost twice as long as Gorbachev). Mikhail Gorbachev is perhaps the figure who is more important for the West, since the freedom of Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War came to fruition under him and largely thanks to him. But it was Boris Yeltsin who defined the face of modern Russia.

Compared to Gorbachev, Yeltsin looked like a revolutionary, ready to go much further than his slow and doubtful opponent. And indeed, it was Yeltsin who dealt the decisive blow to the USSR, acquiring the democratic legitimation of the Russian leader, and an independent Russia led by a popularly elected leader was already the end of the USSR. It was Yeltsin who became the banner of anti-communism. It was he who decided to create a market. It was during Yeltsin’s time that the restoration of the traditional Russian matrix began: autocracy, the combination of power and property, and the return of Russia to its “spheres of influence.” No wonder Russia declared that it would inherit the role of the USSR.

Gorbachev's rule is also dramatic because he did not foresee the consequences of his undertakings, the fact that his breakthrough would deprive him of power, and the fact that his own country is not yet ready to give him his due. But still, the most important thing is that Gorbachev opened the country to freedom and hope.

Understanding the events that occurred in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation from the memorable autumn of 1991 to the present time largely depends on how we relate M.S. Gorbachev with B.N. Yeltsin, Gorbachev perestroika with Yeltsin's liberal democratic reforms . Different judgments and opinions are expressed on this score. For example, A. Razumov decisively contrasts Gorbachev with Yeltsin, not seeing any connection between them, much less continuity. Gorbachev is natural, Yeltsin is accidental , he claims.

Another opinion belongs to F.M. Burlatsky: If we compare two major figures of the former USSR, two former party secretaries - Gorbachev and Yeltsin, he writes, it may seem that history has mistakenly mixed up their places. Yeltsin outwardly looks like a mighty destroyer of the old system. And Gorbachev seemed specially created for creative work. But history is a big joker, it has no goals. Let us remember that she assigned to Kerensky the role of the destroyer of the Russian monarchy, and Lenin - the creator of a new totalitarian state. Therefore, in fact, Gorbachev is the destroyer of the old totalitarian system, and Yeltsin is the creator of the new liberal one.

General D.A. noticed a creative beginning in Yeltsin. Volkogonov. Gorbachev and Yeltsin, we read in his book, are the personal personification of dramatic reformation in a giant country. The first began a utopian attempt to “renew” socialism, unwittingly opening the floodgates to the natural historical flow, which is so painfully difficult to wash away the ruins of Leninism. The second, who for the first time in the centuries-old Russian history became a popularly elected leader, had to do not so much destruction as the creation of a civilized nogo democratic society in the ruins and chaos left after the Bolshevik experiment .

The difference between Gorbachev the reformer and Yeltsin the revolutionary lies solely in the fact that one is inclined to peaceful reform measures, and the other to violent revolutionary actions. And this is because reforms and revolutions, according to their long-term goals and final results, according to Shakhnazarov, are unambiguous, although they are carried out in different ways, the first from above, and the second from below. At the same time, one can hardly deny the fact that Gorbachev’s “reforms” and Yeltsin’s “revolution” were carried out from above against the will of the people, and often contrary to their moods and expectations. From this it is clear that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin are reformers who made changes in Soviet society from above, using the coercive power of state power.

Results reformation Gorbachev was expressively summed up by V.V. Sogrin: By the end of his presidency, the society he had adopted to reform lay in ruins .

Another Kremlin wizard - President Yeltsin, no put to shame Gorbachev's case. Note that now we know what the result was revolution Yeltsin. It is worth noting that it led to even greater chaos, decay and destruction. That is why both Gorbachev and Yeltsin are, in our opinion, classified as destroyers, but not at all creators

There is, of course, a difference between them. It is worth noting that it is on the scale and pace of the collapse of the Russian state and society. Gorbachev walked towards the goal relatively slowly, insinuatingly and carefully, avoiding sudden and radical changes. He could not act otherwise, since the degree of risk was enormous: one hasty, ill-considered step, and he would be finished, as they say, the lid. It must be admitted that Gorbachev carried out the most difficult, the most difficult, the most responsible and, it must be said, the most dangerous part of the task for himself, demonstrating extraordinary dexterity, political resourcefulness, the ability to act, deceive and fool people.

Conclusion

And in conclusion, it should be noted that often M.S. Gorbachev has been criticized for his foreign policy, with one of the critics' arguments being that the last Soviet leader was a Westernizer. Of course, this is correct to a certain extent when it comes to worldview, but the regional aspect of Gorbachev’s course was sufficiently balanced. This, in particular, is proven by the activity of Soviet diplomacy in the Afghan, Chinese and Japanese directions. In general, it should be noted that the settlement in all these three areas met the interests of the USSR: in relations with China and Afghanistan, it was necessary to create conditions for normalizing the situation on the borders of the USSR; in relations with Japan, the economic factor was important. Of course, it cannot be said that everything worked out as planned: in the case of Japan, it was essentially marking time; actions in the Chinese direction, to a large extent, normalized bilateral relations, but by no means made them warm ; As for Afghanistan, it was not possible to solve the main geopolitical task - to remove or push the conflict away from the borders of the USSR. So there were mistakes in the eastern direction (as well as in others) of the Soviet foreign policy course. However, there were also positive features. Firstly, we chose the right strategic direction: resolving conflicts and normalizing relations. Secondly, in the case of Afghanistan, the USSR finally got out of a hopeless military adventure; in the case of China and Japan, they realized that there were no insoluble problems - they had to work. So, despite the miscalculations, on the whole, the course was chosen correctly - it met the interests of the USSR.

And Yeltsin made mistakes, and this must be admitted. Currently, those who criticize Yeltsin consider one of his main shortcomings to be the frequent changes in personnel that began immediately after he came to power. However, one can argue whether this is his mistake or not. The fact is that Yeltsin always pursued a policy in which he set a specific political goal. To achieve this goal, he selected specific people and appointed them to important positions. When he saw that the task had been solved, or, conversely, that the person was not coping with the task, he removed him. One can criticize this policy, but one must admit that, guided by precisely these principles, Yeltsin was able to solve a large number of problems important for Russia. He led the country to a market economy, he carried out democratic reforms and now acts as a guarantor of respect for the democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, who, by the way, finally got the opportunity to elect parliament and the president democratically, he once again strengthened Russia on the world political stage. Moreover, much of what Yeltsin did, he did for the first time in more than 70 years. He had a lot to teach the Russians, how to live in another, democratic country.

List of used literature

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Furman D. The Gorbachev phenomenon. //Free thought. - 1995. - N11. - C/60-71.

From the very beginning, Boris Yeltsin's behavior was dominated by one obsession - irreconcilable competition with Gorbachev. The main task for him was to gain full power.

Understanding the events that took place in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation from the memorable autumn of 1991 to the present time largely depends on how we relate M.S. Gorbachev with B.N. Yeltsin, Gorbachev’s “perestroika” with Yeltsin’s liberal-democratic “reforms”. Different judgments and opinions are expressed on this score. For example, A. Razumov decisively contrasts Gorbachev with Yeltsin, not seeing any connection between them, much less continuity. “Gorbachev is natural, Yeltsin is accidental,” he asserts.

Another opinion belongs to F.M. Burlatsky: “If you compare two major figures of the former USSR, two former party secretaries - Gorbachev and Yeltsin,” he writes, “it may seem that history has mistakenly mixed up their places. Yeltsin outwardly looks like a mighty destroyer of the old system. And Gorbachev seemed specially created for creative work. But history is a big joker, it also has goals. Let us remember that she assigned to Kerensky the role of the destroyer of the Russian monarchy, and Lenin - the creator of a new totalitarian state. Therefore, in fact, Gorbachev is the destroyer of the old totalitarian system, and Yeltsin is the creator of the new liberal one.

General D.A. noticed a creative beginning in Yeltsin. Volkogonov. “Gorbachev and Yeltsin,” we read in his book, “are the personal personification of dramatic reformation in a gigantic country. The first began a utopian attempt to “renew” socialism, unwittingly opening the floodgates to the natural historical flow, which is so painfully difficult to wash away the ruins of Leninism. The second, for the first time in the centuries-old Russian history, became popular among the people. elected leader, had to deal not so much with destruction, but with the creation of a civilized democratic society from the ruins and chaos left after the Bolshevik experiment.”

The difference between Gorbachev the reformer and Yeltsin the revolutionary lies solely in the fact that one is inclined to peaceful reform measures, and the other to violent revolutionary actions. AND??? because reforms and revolutions, according to their long-term goals and final results, according to Shakhnazarov, are unambiguous, although they are carried out in different ways, the first from above, and the second from below. At the same time, one can hardly deny the fact that Gorbachev’s “reforms” and Yeltsin’s “revolution” were carried out from above against the will of the people, and often contrary to their moods and expectations. From this it is clear that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin are reformers who made changes in Soviet society from above, using the coercive power of state power.

The results of Gorbachev’s “reformation” were summed up expressively by V.V. Sogrin: “By the end of his tenure as president, the society he had accepted for reform lay in ruins.”

Another Kremlin “wizard,” President Yeltsin, did not “shame” Gorbachev’s cause. Let us note that now we know what Yeltsin’s “revolution” led to. It is worth noting that it led to even greater chaos, decay and destruction. That is why both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, in our opinion, are classified as destroyers, but not at all creators

There is, of course, a difference between them. It is worth noting that it is on the scale and pace of the collapse of the Russian state and society. Gorbachev walked towards the goal relatively slowly, insinuatingly and carefully, avoiding sudden and radical changes. He could not act otherwise, since the degree of risk was enormous: one hasty, ill-considered step, and he would be finished, as they say, the lid. It must be admitted that Gorbachev completed the most difficult, the most difficult, the most responsible and, it must be said, the most dangerous part of the task for himself, showing extraordinary dexterity, political resourcefulness, the ability to act, deceive and fool people.

From chapter 5 "M.S. Gorbachev. The beginning of perestroika" of the book "The Sun at its Zenith".

From June 28 to July 1, 1988, the 19th All-Union Party Conference of the CPSU was held in Moscow.

The previous All-Union Conference was held in the party 47 years ago.

Its main task, as they explained to us then, is to answer the questions of what are the first results of perestroika, what needs to be done to remove the obstacles standing in its way, and how to make the process of revolutionary renewal irreversible.

Conference agenda:

1. On the progress of implementation of the decisions of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, the main results of the first half of the 12th Five-Year Plan and the tasks of party organizations to deepen the process of restructuring.

2. On measures for further democratization of the party and society.
M.S. made presentations at the conference. Gorbachev.

After four days of comprehensive discussion, conference participants adopted the following resolutions:

On the progress of implementing the decisions of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU and the tasks of deepening perestroika,”

- “On the democratization of Soviet society and the reform of the political system”,

- “On the fight against bureaucracy”,

- “On interethnic relations”,

- “On publicity”,

- “On legal reform.”

On July 1, 1988, Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin, First Deputy Chairman of the State Construction Committee, Minister of the USSR, spoke at the afternoon meeting.

His speech was received ambiguously, since it was fundamentally different from the general mood of the conference delegates, the praise of perestroika.

At the evening meeting, some delegates asked to speak and expressed their attitude towards B.N. Yeltsin and his speech at the conference.

Among them:

Secretary of the Party Committee of the Sverdlovsk Machine-Building Plant named after M.I. Kalinina V.A. Volkov,

General Director of the Scientific and Production Association “Machine-Tool Plant named after Sergo Ordzhonikidze” N.S. Chikirev,

First Secretary of the Proletarsky District Committee of the CPSU of Moscow I.S. Lukin.

Thus, the confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin intensified in mid-1988.

Before the act of abolition of the CPSU by Yeltsin B.N. There were just over three years left.

In the fall of 1988, M.S. Gorbachev carried out radical changes in the party apparatus and began to implement political reform.

The old guard has been retired: A.A. Gromyko, M.S. Solomentsev, V.I. Dolgikh, P.N. Demichev, A.F. Dobrynin.

New people appeared in the Politburo and in other high positions: V.A. Medvedev, V.M. Chebrikov, A.V. Vlasov, A.P. Biryukova, A.I. Lukyanov, B.K. Pugo.

On October 1, 1988 in Moscow at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Gorbachev M.S. was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, retaining the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

A.I. was elected First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Lukyanov.

The post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR remained with N.I. Ryzhkov.

V.A. was appointed Chairman of the State Security Committee of the USSR. Kryuchkov.

On October 3, 1988, an extraordinary session of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR of the eleventh convocation took place.

Organizational issues were resolved there.

Vitaly Ivanovich Vorotnikov was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

Vlasov Alexander Vladimirovich was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR.

But that's not all political reforms!

The Congress of People's Deputies was scheduled for April 1989, at which new government bodies were to be formed.

But for this it was necessary to revise legislative acts and make changes to the Constitution of the USSR.

Mikhail Gorbachev steadily pursued the policy of carrying out political, economic and social reforms.

2010 Grateful

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I received Vlasov in our area. Two photos left.
There will be a chapter on his visit entitled “All-Union Seminar-Meeting”.
The guy is phlegmatic. Democratically, the delegation traveled on buses. He slept almost all the time.

At the conference, the sessions of which were broadcast on television throughout the country, Yeltsin repeated live the provisions of his speech at the plenum, demanded that the decision about the “political fallacy” of that speech be reversed, and also that Ligachev be removed from the Politburo. The conference refused to do this, Yeltsin was again subjected to impartial attacks, and soon the Supreme Soviet of the USSR removed him from the membership of its Presidium. The meme, as we would call it now, then became the phrase that Ligachev said in his speech at the party conference: “Boris, you’re wrong!”

Thanks to public debates at the party conference, Yeltsin, hitherto known mainly only in Moscow and Sverdlovsk, gained all-Russian popularity. He finally takes the path of open confrontation with the party-union leadership, using the new opportunities of “glasnost” proclaimed by Gorbachev. There is information that before the elections in March 1989 of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR - the new highest body of power created in accordance with the decision of the XIX Party Conference - Yeltsin was asked to go along the list of 100 deputies to be elected by the Central Committee of the CPSU (of which Yeltsin remained a member). For Yeltsin's consent, they promised to restore him to his previous party positions. But Yeltsin chose to mobilize his supporters in democratic elections. He was elected to the Congress by an overwhelming margin from the national-territorial district, which included Moscow. However, he did not become a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Nevertheless, later, thanks to the refusal of deputy A.I. Kazannika from his mandate in favor of Yeltsin, despite the fact that such a procedure was not provided for by law, became a member of the Supreme Council.

In connection with the upcoming elections of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR in the spring of 1990, Yeltsin shifted the center of gravity of the fight against Gorbachev to the republican authorities, without trying to take a high place in the union authorities. This decision can be considered a milestone - from that moment the confrontation between the USSR and the RSFSR began. By that time, Yeltsin had already become one of the most authoritative figures in the “democratic movement,” constantly and sharply criticizing the leadership of the USSR and the CPSU for their reluctance to establish true democracy in the country (during the same period, a joke was born that ridiculed Gorbachev’s slogans: “What is the difference between democracy and democratization? “The same as a channel from a sewer”). The Democrats themselves nominated Yeltsin for the role of public leader. Numerous incidents in which Yeltsin skillfully presented himself as a victim of the intrigues of the CPSU leadership and even attempts by the KGB to eliminate him physically contributed to the growth of his popularity.

Gorbachev - Yeltsin: 1500 days of political confrontation Dobrokhotov LN

Political struggle and drama of peoples

Now, when these lines are being written, the first and last President of the former USSR, who renounced the CPSU and its General Secretary, the favorite of the West and a significant part of the rest of the world, has been gone for three months now and, in the opinion of many, forever from the big political arena. And on the contrary, his opponent, who for a long time played “second fiddle,” today is in the rank of President of Russia, at the pinnacle of power.

While the press talks meaningfully about the future activities of the Gorbachev Foundation, the belief is becoming widespread that the people “quickly and with pleasure” forgot the main architect of the catastrophic perestroika. But is it? In the opposition media, predominantly of a national-patriotic orientation, the theme of Gorbachev has recently persistently sounded in a completely new aspect. A public commission “to investigate the anti-people, anti-state activities” of M. Gorbachev, accused of “deliberately destroying the country in the interests of other powers,” the collapse of its economy and statehood, violating territorial integrity, provoking interethnic conflicts and mass impoverishment of the people, was created and announced itself. manifestation of personal immodesty and self-interest.

This is the reality. It is clear that responsibility lies not only with Gorbachev, but also with his immediate circle. How fair such accusations are, while still not devoid of emotional overtones, will apparently be shown in the future, when society has access to comprehensive information about everything related to the plan and implementation of perestroika. But should we be surprised at such a painful reaction from the people who suffered from ill-conceived or unimplemented, or poorly implemented reforms? No, there is absolutely nothing to be surprised at - after all, Gorbachev achieved results that were directly opposite to what was declared six years ago, at the height of his political career. The leader promised the Soviet people a renewal of society, figuratively speaking, “a shining Temple on a green hill,” but a socialist temple, with its social justice for all, equal rights for all, laws for all, discipline for all, high responsibilities for everyone. It was he who repeated: we intend to carry out all our transformations in accordance with the socialist choice and this is not the whim of the leaders, this is the demand of the people. “The people ask for only one thing: do not move away from socialism.” The Secretary General and the President repeated such and similar words more than once from the highest tribunes, promising “bitter disappointment” to those “who hope that we will turn away from the socialist path,” and even more so “we will move to another camp.” Saying that “we will move towards better socialism, and not away from it,” he considered it necessary to constantly emphasize the honesty and openness of such a position, the absence of any guile both before his own people and before foreign countries (it is useful to pay attention to this, because ... later there will be discouraging confessions on this matter).

Since in the end everything turned out, according to a popular expression, “exactly the opposite” - the anger of the people becomes understandable and clear, at least that part of it (and this is, of course, a very significant part) that could not easily overcome other politicians overnight renounce the so-called socialist mentality.

But it would be incorrect to say that public opinion has lost all traces of a positive attitude towards the activities of M.S. Gorbachev. Letters from “ordinary people” who ardently defend Mikhail Sergeevich, mainly for his good intentions, still appear in newspapers, albeit very rarely. Not everyone realizes the scale of the national tragedy to which, objectively, regardless of the initial aspirations, the leaders of perestroika brought the country in the blind frenzy of the total destruction of the foundations of statehood, economic and social ties.

Trying to objectively look at the fruits of M.S.’s reformism. Gorbachev, political scientists recognize certain achievements behind perestroika, emphasizing that they all lie in the spiritual, ideological and psychological sphere: pluralism of opinions, de-ideologization, glasnost. They talk (mostly in today's government press) about getting rid of “the fear of enslavement by a partyocratic state.” The successes of international policy that led to the end of the Cold War are noted. At the same time, it follows a sober statement of the fact that the price paid by society for the received spiritual connections turned out to be prohibitively high, because on the other side of the scale is the collapse of the state, economy, social and national ties, legal chaos, plus instead of a “cold war” - pockets of quite “hot” » conflicts.

As for identifying the negative results of perestroika, here we probably will not find any difference of opinion, at least among domestic politicians who were not involved in the implementation of its course, political scientists, and publicists. But there is another point of view regarding the “achievements” noted above, whose supporters also find convincing arguments. With an optimistic conclusion, M.S. Gorbachev, made by him based on the results of his own activities, that “society received freedom, became liberated politically and spiritually,” they believe, apparently only those who have not yet found themselves below the poverty line and have not tasted all the delights of poverty, will not be plunged into the abyss agree interethnic carnage, not recruited into the rapidly growing army of the unemployed, who are deaf to the unprecedented humiliation of the nation in the international arena, who do not see the colonial prospects prepared for the former great power. De-ideologization simply turns out to be the replacement of one ideology with another, with the opposite sign; the ability to freely express opinions is limited by the “economic stranglehold” thrown on unwanted media. Thus, the question of political and spiritual emancipation and established democracy turns out to be debatable. And in relation to the current moment, one can increasingly hear about the danger of growing anarchy, moving, at best, towards a rigid authoritarian system, or even towards a new dictatorship, although called democratic. The Moscow events of February 23 of this year gave new grounds for this kind of judgment (by the way, the champion of democracy M.S. Gorbachev justifies the actions of the top of the Moscow government using batons against war veterans, old people and women. How can we understand this?).

The thesis about getting rid of the fear of enslavement by a totalitarian partocratic state is also questioned. Did the bulk of the working people, who had quite a decent standard of living and calm confidence in the future, experience such “enslavement”? And if there was such fear, then how much better is the fear of unemployment, poverty, hunger, and the threat of new bloodshed in the civil war that replaced it?

And, finally, the most significant “trump card” is merits in the international arena, the end of the Cold War. But Gorbachev and the instigators of his political line prefer to talk about cessation. President Bush at home uses a different formulation: Western victory in the Cold War. And if there is victory, then there is also defeat. This kind of doubt also cannot but visit many, many people.

Thus, what remains of the “positive balance” of perestroika? Today it is difficult for an ordinary person to get any comforting answers to all these questions. But today our household affairs, not without our servile encouragement, are categorically judged somewhere out there, “over the hill,” and the confused public opinion, as in the glorious Griboyedov times, is oriented exclusively towards the West. What does the West say? Is he able to understand our troubles and pains? Or, praising us for our insane impulse of self-destruction, does he pursue his own selfish, selfish goals? Let's listen to him...

World leaders of the West and the USA unanimously predict M.S. Gorbachev “has an honorable place in history” for the simple reason that he, in the words of the French newspaper Le Monde, “did exactly what was expected of him...” (it’s worth noting: they expected it there, in the West, not here) . Well, what they expected is also no secret. With his departure, according to the Voice of Israel, “the era of the shaking of the foundations of the Soviet empire and communist ideology ended,” and Radio Liberty associates the world-historical significance of the day of the resignation of the last leader of the Soviet Union with the fact that “from now on, this huge countries". Yes, foreign leaders do not skimp on superlatives when assessing the activities of our President. “His resignation marks the culmination of a remarkable era in the history of his country (this is when the country is shedding blood in inter-ethnic conflicts, it is flooded with hundreds of thousands of refugees, when 80% of the population is thrown below the poverty line, and the threat of famine looms over the largest cities...) and its long, often difficult relationship with the United States,” says US President George W. Bush. “He established freedom in his country, contributed to the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the disarmament process,” echoes French President Francois Mitterrand. “Gorbachev managed to “change the course of history”, left his country “on a confident path to democracy,” British Prime Minister John Major echoes them, and of course, Chancellor of a united Germany Helmut Kohl assures us all that Mikhail Gorbachev “brought his country from a 70-year state of stagnation and oppression, contributed to the free development of the peoples of Central, Eastern, Southern Europe and confirmed their right to choose their own path...”

Yes, world and Western European politicians operate in categories of historical scale. But they operate deliberately, not wanting to see behind abstractions like “freedom and democracy” the bitter realities, the concrete misfortunes of the common man, the people.

Foreign political scientists, unlike politicians, are often very critical of Gorbachev, accusing him of saying a lot and doing little, underestimating the importance of ethnic conflicts, stubbornly insisting on preserving the Union and avoiding necessary economic reforms because they were politically impossible. However, their conclusion is lenient: “we should not place too heavy a burden of guilt on him.”

Yes, the question of the leader’s responsibility is also very acute. And again, discarding the shades, we see two positions: the calls we have already mentioned to investigate “anti-national activities” - on the one hand, and on the other hand, to rely entirely on the court of history. And the verdict of history will depend on whether the country will choose the rutted road of civilization, rise from the ashes, or perish, disappear, as once powerful states of other eras disappeared. If we survive, Gorbachev will be the forerunner of the country’s revival; if not, he will be its gravedigger. Therefore, no one else but the people, again, will have to, tightening their belts and gritting their teeth, work for the bright image of our leader in historical annals.

The fate of reformism in Russia and the recent Union awakens bitter thoughts and leaves many questions to which comprehensive answers have not yet been received. Historical experience, even not so distant, testifies that a good reform plan, as a rule, was either slowed down halfway, was not implemented enough, or was embodied in something directly opposite. Such is the understatement, the half-heartedness of the reforms of the 60s of the last century, the forcibly interrupted process of Stolypin’s undertakings, the same “rein” of suppressing the course of the new economic policy, the collapse of Khrushchev’s violent reforms, the timid attempts of Kosygin, Andropov under conditions of absolute time pressure... And every time - incompleteness, rejection by reality. Each time, practice put the theoretical model and concept to shame.

The same fate, if not more dramatic, befell Gorbachev’s reformism. Perestroika had a great start: it was said that the concept of renewing society, achieving its new quality was developed, bright prospects were drawn... The people warmly supported it. And in the end - a tragic ending. As they say, we went to the dogs and came back shorn. What are the reasons for this is a question, of course, for special study, but the attentive reader has undoubtedly received a lot to answer it in the course of getting acquainted with the materials of this book.

In numerous publications trying to comprehend the collapse of the “Gorbachev era” and the reforms he conceived, the problem, unfortunately, is rarely considered globally, in the context of urgent modernization within the entire world community. And on a national scale, the objective factor is also not fully taken into account. The search for the reasons for the defeat of perestroika so far has been reduced mainly to the subjective factor and on the surface there is talk about the role of individuals, their positions, level of competence, moral standards and other individual qualities. Hot on the heels of events, this is probably natural, especially since subjective aspects cannot be underestimated either (and more fundamental research is ahead).

The reasons for the defeat of Gorbachev the politician are interpreted differently. There is an opinion that he was ruined by half measures (by the way, this is a constant reproach against him from Yeltsin), the desire to simply repair and adjust the system. He is a reformer who was constantly “held by the coattails” by the old, primarily party-bureaucratic structures, the environment that raised him and with which he could not break. And although he evolved towards greater radicalism, he nevertheless did not have time to decisively define his positions (or did it too late). At the same time, Gorbachev was a reformer who used revolutionary phraseology, which allowed radical liberal democratic forces (called radical left) to intercept the “banner of perestroika”, changing the existing political and economic system. Those who believe that as a politician Gorbachev turned out to be completely bankrupt, despite all the nuances of their attitude towards him, perhaps agree on one thing when they decisively deny him professionalism: the absence of their own hard-won views, concepts and clear goals, responsibility, and the gift of foresight.

But there is another position. Gorbachev the revolutionary. And he declared his revolutionary intentions openly and immediately - “revolutionary perestroika.” And since every revolution presupposes a socio-political explosion, a change of system, then talk about humane democratic socialism was nothing more than distracting rhetoric and those who fell for this bait should blame themselves, and what happened in August 1991 was “bourgeois revolution" is nothing more than the initially sought result. In light of this, the departure of Gorbachev the politician from the stage is not perceived as his bankruptcy, because the main goal has been achieved, and the work begun is continued by his opponent, who supposedly opposed him for several years of perestroika.

It seems that only time will tell which of the current viewpoints on Gorbachev are closer to the truth.

This is about Gorbachev. But what do they say, think and write about Yeltsin today? He's always there. He goes hand in hand with Gorbachev. And all both encouraging and bleak results are the fruit of their common efforts. True, at some stages Yeltsin preferred to distance himself from Gorbachev. But today a certain part of the public is inclined to believe that it was Yeltsin who brought our country final liberation from an alien regime of power, that it was he who was the “great destroyer.”

With the name B.N. Yeltsin is associated with a rebellion against the system, its crisis, which broke out in the very top echelons of power. The so-called “Yeltsin phenomenon” is phenomenal because the challenge to the party-bureaucratic apparatus was thrown by one of the most senior functionaries of this apparatus, and the masses, long dissatisfied with the omnipotence of the party aristocracy, immediately responded to the populist slogans of the fighter against its “unreasonable privileges,” an ardent defender of social justice and enthusiastically recognized him as their leader. Moreover, the rebel was subjected to severe execution and was overthrown from Olympus. There is an opinion that the secret of Yeltsin’s popularity is explained not only by the socio-psychological factor of the compassion of the Russian people, who always give their sympathies to those who suffered for the truth, but also by the purposeful activities of the media, which found themselves predominantly in the hands of those political forces that, striving to change social political system, they relied on this politician as the only one who, having personal scores with the authorities, at the same time could challenge the all-powerful party-bureaucratic system at a sufficiently high level. The press, television and radio made the party functionary Yeltsin a spokesman and defender of people's interests, with the pragmatic goal of removing the party from the political arena. There was simply no other, more suitable figure on the political horizon.

From now on, everything Yeltsin said became the voice of the people. And many political scientists see the difference between Gorbachev and Yeltsin precisely in the fact that the former, with all his commitment to democratic reforms, is bound by his apparatus birthright, the environment that created him, while the latter decisively broke with it, taking the side of the people. Hence his radicalism, his ardent desire to reform the system in the name of universal blat.

Another widespread opinion is that the driving force behind Yeltsin’s political activity was an insatiable thirst for power. That his style is an “iron hand”, a desire for dictatorship, and talk about democracy is only a convenient means of achieving the goal. He simply cannot be anything else, because all of his leadership experience is the experience of the administrative-command system with which he is tied, although he fought against it. His populism is by no means a sign of democracy, but quite the opposite. As history shows, it is populism that is a sign of a dictator, it puts him “on the throne”, provides him with popular support, which is then easily ignored by those who have established themselves in power.

Yeltsin the politician is also seen as an oppositionist in his role, as a destroyer. The creative part of the program is something in which he has not yet demonstrated himself and many political scientists simply deny him the ability to do.

Unexpectedly, diametrically opposed views are expressed on the ideological basis that determines Yeltsin’s activities. One point of view: Yeltsin is a pragmatic manager. He is completely free from any ideology. There is no point in accusing him of apostasy from Marxism, because he has never been a Marxist, despite his forty years of party experience. He was a diligent functionary of that system, which was called socialist, and was guided for the time being, while it was still viable, by the “rules of the game” established by it. I sincerely tried to make it more effective in my place. With the change in the situation, he easily freed himself from the influence of “isms” and, in a new capacity, was again concerned not with serving ideological idols, but with the effectiveness of a specific cause... And this quality of his seems to be a great blessing for Russia, which has suffered more than enough from the ideological dictate of the Bolsheviks.

But there is another view. Yeltsin's non-partisanship is imaginary. He threw off his Marxist clothes to immediately put on democratic clothes, or rather, liberal democratic ones, in which the majority of “Demorossians” flaunt. Their ideology is a “mirror ideology” of the just rejected Marxist-Leninist one, only with the opposite sign (the plus is changed to a minus). Neo-Bolshevik methods of leadership logically follow from this: the same ideological intolerance, the same authoritarian style, disregard for law, etc., etc.

It is clear that the policies of leaders are formed under the influence of a whole complex of factors of a socio-economic, political, and even geopolitical nature. But the influence of the subjective sense of certain political forces, groupings, right up to the closest circle of leaders is also strong. And from this point of view, Gorbachev was always suspected by some of being strongly influenced by the party-Soviet corps, all the old structures of the reformed state apparatus, and by others of following in line with the so-called radical left politics. And his persistent calls for reasonable centrism were received with equal distrust on both the right and the left.

In relation to Yeltsin, the question of influence is just as relevant. However, there is a significant nuance here. If criticism from the right, accusing his team of the harmfulness of the policy being pursued, extends to the Russian President himself, even to the point of demanding resignation, then criticism from the left is so far limited to only censure of the “team”, taking the President himself out of the “fire zone”.

So, two leaders, two styles. Something brings them together and something separates them on opposite sides of the barricades. History was willing to arrange it in such a way as to pit them in a grueling confrontation at the most crucial stage in the life of the country. A confrontation dramatic for her fate.

Now, when a powerful state, located on a sixth of the earth’s landmass, has recently been destroyed, when a change in the socio-political system has occurred in the crumbling republics, the confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin should be viewed from the most “acute” angle: to what extent did it contribute to the collapse of the Union, what their real role in that tragic turn of events when uncontrollable processes took precedence over the truly transformative ones?

And was the external confrontation between the two leaders a confrontation in its deep, internal essence? Were the opponents initially moving towards the same goal, but directly opposite to the one that was declared? We pose these questions without considering it necessary to give an unambiguous answer to them. Let the material presented in the book serve as food for thought... And we only reminded what positions and views exist on this problem.

The confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin initially looked like a struggle between the more radical wing of perestroika and the less radical, or rather centrist, direction, given the common Bolshevik, partocratic past of the reformers and, in principle, the equally understood nature of the modernization of society. Even at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in May 1989, voices were heard calling not to pit Gorbachev and Yeltsin against each other, not to pit them against each other, since “these are two wings of perestroika.” And Yeltsin himself, as you know, in the summer of that year was ready to “fight for Gorbachev.” Fundamental differences associated with the denial of the socialist idea and the legalization of the course towards the capitalization of society (unless, of course, these differences were, as some believe, imaginary, and the President’s rhetoric did not contradict his true aspirations) began to appear in the summer of 1990, i.e. that is, from the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, at which B.N. Yeltsin had already diligently avoided the question of the socialist nature of the structure of the Russian Federation, intensified by November 1990, after his exit from the CPSU, and resulted in a frank dotting of the i's by March-April 1991. B.N. Yeltsin actually becomes the head of the opposition, which, having initially intercepted the socialist “banner of perestroika” and from a certain moment no longer considered it necessary to further hide its true intentions, took an open course towards the implementation of exclusively liberal democratic values, waged a struggle for power with the aim of changing social -political and socio-economic structure in the country.

In the left-radical, democratic media, the dominant motive is strictly imposed on public opinion: the President of the USSR betrayed perestroika, went to the right, began to strive for dictatorship, for the restoration of the dead-end model of a bureaucratic, unitary state of the Stalin-Brezhnev type. Hence the irreconcilable position of confrontation, the demand for the resignation of the President, the dissolution of the USSR Supreme Council, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, etc. By the way, it was precisely at this time that a very symptomatic dispute broke out about where is “right” and where is “left” " Gorbachev, who dared to remind the politicized public of the classical understanding of left radicalism and right conservatism, immediately received a crushing rebuff from all the weapons of the “democratic” press. In general, the media at this stage are putting more and more open pressure on the President, literally dictating and suggesting the expected necessary steps. This is done from both sides, so that the President is constantly under fire from criticism, constantly maneuvering, demonstrating his famous talent for compromise and evasiveness (which ultimately led him to a natural ending).

Since the summer of 1990, to the contradictions associated with the gradual departure from the socialist nature of perestroika, the center-republic contradictions have been added, and the struggle for the preservation and destruction of the Union has broken out. Its apogee was the referendum on March 17, 1991. In the minds of a significant, almost overwhelming majority of people, the question is: to be or not to be a Union? - reduced to the formula “Gorbachev or Yeltsin.” The struggle of political lines, perhaps unprecedentedly for the post-Stalin period of our development, was personified in these two personalities, in their confrontation. The newspaper “Soviet Russia” published information that had an almost symbolic meaning about how at one of the factories a dispute between two workers, supporters of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which escalated into a fight, tragically ended in the death of one of them. Passions ran high to an alarming degree. And although, again, due to the predominantly one-sided influence of the media on public consciousness, M.S. Gorbachev looked like a defender of a disgusted totalitarian state and a brake on radical changes, and Yeltsin was the personification of democracy, reforms, independence of the republics and, in particular, the sovereignty of Russia - the people nevertheless spoke out for the preservation of the Union. However, in practice, this did not mean the end of the confrontation on this issue in favor of M.S. Gorbachev. The fight continued. The people are a force, politicians say, that cannot be ignored. Theoretically correct position. However, in real life, unfortunately, we often encounter leaders who not only manipulate popular opinion, but sometimes openly ignore it. True, this has its own certain consequences. Both for the fate of politicians and for peoples.

It should be noted that there was also a point of view on the nature of the Gorbachev-Yeltsin confrontation that differed from the one we have just considered. Moreover, she spoke out, although not so loudly, already at fairly early stages of the confrontation between the two leaders of perestroika. According to this position, the confrontation was regarded as a fiction, as a false confrontation, as a political show, to which the same forces of a destructive, anti-people, anti-state nature were resorting. The political line, with the possible exception of some minor nuances, is that only the scenery in the form of key political figures is different. And as soon as one figure loses credibility in the eyes of the people, he is replaced by another, regaining credibility by criticizing the previous one, but pursuing essentially the same policy. It is not without reason, supporters of this point of view emphasize, that Gorbachev’s former “presidential team”, having discredited him, almost in its entirety went over to Yeltsin. Clearly, the conclusion is drawn from this that the policy of the new leader, guided by the old advisers, will be the same.

It is curious that this point of view is already at a qualitatively different level, but confirms the initial position of the confrontation, when, despite the tactical differences of opponents, the truth was considered immutable that Gorbachev and Yeltsin were “two wings of perestroika”, that they were going in the same direction. Yes, indeed, it turned out that they initially went in the same direction and then began to evolve in the same direction. The difference, again, is only in pace, frankness, more or less guile, but not in the objective content of the process itself.

At the last, catastrophic stage of the struggle, when M.S. Gorbachev consistently gave up his socialist positions, trying to cling on at any cost, if not to power, then at least to its illusory semblance; he said a lot of things that give reason to doubt the sincerity of his initial positions (for many, another dilemma remains unclear: either he allowed a blunder or a tragic figure who became a victim of irresistible forces). So, M.S. Gorbachev declared his main historical achievement to be the “peaceful (?) dismantling of the totalitarian state” (apparently, bloody clashes on ethnic grounds do not count). But were such goals set in 1985? And here follows a more than symptomatic confession made by M.S. Gorbachev in a conversation with the editor-in-chief of Moscow News L. Karpinsky: “I still have a better idea of the idea of perestroika than others; not everything that is outlined in political documents covers the scale and depth of the planned transformations. It was necessary to change the system, I came to this. But if SamRo had started with Samo, without preparing the society, to pose the question in this way, nothing would have happened...” The position is extremely clear: the system had to be changed! But, since the people are not ready for a sharp turn in their destiny, goals are hidden from them, humane socialist rhetoric reigns in political documents... If the former president and architect of perestroika is sincere in these last statements of his, then was there a serious reason for the confrontation between Gorbachev and Gorbachev? Yeltsin? Of course, in addition to ambitious and personal motives... By the way, about the former President’s commitment to various kinds of secrets and “figures of silence”, his new press secretary recently once again mentioned, saying that the holder of the Gorbachev Foundation has a dozen more secrets, capable of making his next memoir a bestseller.

What do these secrets cost the gullible people with their undiminished faith in the possibility of achieving social justice?

However, the compilers, as already emphasized, do not impose on readers any of the existing and stated above points of view on the Gorbachev-Yeltsin confrontation. Based on the fact that this fact took place and became complete, and its socio-political significance is beyond doubt, they proposed a chronicle of this confrontation, its internal content for independent analysis and conclusions.

M. K. Gorshkov, Doctor of Philosophy

L. I. Dobrokhotov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences

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